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Abstract— Emerging Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technologies have 
enabled various types of content to be efficiently distributed over 
the Internet. In order to achieve optimized user quality of 
experience, most P2P systems adopt selfish peer selection 
schemes in the application layer. On the network side, traffic 
engineering (TE) is deployed by ISPs in order to achieve efficient 
network resource utilization. These TE operations are typically 
performed without distinguishing between P2P flows and other 
types of traffic. Due to inconsistent or even conflicting objectives 
from the perspectives of P2P overlay and network-level TE, the 
interactions between the two and their impact on the relevant 
performance for each is yet to be investigated in detail. In this 
paper we study such non-cooperative interactions through the 
modeling of best-reply dynamics in which the P2P overlay and 
network-level TE optimize their own strategies based on the 
decision of the other player in the previous round. According to 
our experiments based on data from the ABILENE network, P2P 
overlays exhibit strong resilience to adverse TE operations in 
maintaining end-to-end performance in the application layer. On 
the other hand, network-level TE may suffer from performance 
deterioration caused by greedy peer (re)selection behaviors in 
reacting to previous TE adjustments. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, P2P flows account for some 50%-70% of the 
overall Internet traffic, according to recent traffic 
measurements [1, 2]. Under such circumstances, network 
capacity for other types of services, such as conventional web-
based applications, may be impacted due to the potential 
resource competition with overwhelming P2P traffic. In the 
literature, traffic engineering (TE) techniques have been 
proposed for ISPs to optimize customer traffic in order to 
improve the overall network performance, such as load 
balancing and network cost reduction. It should be noted that, 
in general, TE solutions do not distinguish between P2P flows 
and conventional Internet traffic, which means that traffic 
optimization is performed in an aggregate fashion, regardless 
of specific types of flows. In P2P overlay networks, the 
current implementation of peer selection paradigms are often 
based on application-layer optimization for enhancing the 
quality of experience by end users. For instance, real-time 
multimedia P2P systems usually select partner peers that are 
associated with low delay in order to achieve fast playback at 
the user side. On the other hand, the objective of TE is to 
improve the overall performance at the network side, instead 
of focusing on individual users. As such, there is an obvious 
misalignment between the TE objectives and the selfish P2P 
peer selection in the application layer. As for the two 
autonomous entities – P2P overlay and network-level TE, the 
decisions that are made by each one of them may influence the 
performance of the other. Such interactions may adversely 
impact the relevant performance on both sides due to 
“conflicting” operations. For instance, TE may adjust the 
underlying routing decisions in order to re-optimize network 
performance, but such a change may also shift some P2P 
traffic to alternative paths with sub-optimal user-perceived 
QoS performance (e.g. higher end-to-end delay due to longer 
paths). As a result, the P2P overlay may react to such 
dynamics by re-selecting partners in each P2P session in order 
to regain the original performance in the application layer. 
Such a behavior will once again change the overall traffic 
condition so that the underlying TE mechanisms need to react 
accordingly. This adjustment of network configurations may 
further trigger re-selection of peers in the P2P overlay. In this 
paper we investigate the interaction between selfish peer 
selections and optimized routing configurations in non-
cooperative environments.  
In the literature, a number of research works [3, 4, 5, 6] 
have investigated the interaction between TE and overlay 
network operations. We can classify these works into two 
different categories: one category focuses on the interactions 
between network-layer routing configurations decided by TE 
and logical overlay routing on top [3, 4]. In this scenario, TE 
and the overlay respectively adjust their own routing strategies 
in turn, based on each other’s decisions. Compared with this 
type of interactions, the key difference from our work is as 
follows: the P2P overlay only considers how to select the best 
partner peers (i.e. the other endpoint of individual P2P 
connection sessions), rather than changing the routing 
configuration in the overlay. The other category [5, 6] focuses 
on the interaction between network-layer routing decisions 
made by TE and application-layer content server selections in 
CDN (Content Distribution Network) –like paradigms. Still, 
our work also differs from them in the following features. First, 
in P2P overlay networks, peers, as both content producers and 
consumers, have highly dynamic join/departure patterns, while 
in CDNs content servers are statically provisioned in the 
network for providing content delivery services. In addition, 
we consider symmetric content exchange patterns: in P2P 
overlays a peer not only requests data from, but also provides 
content to other peers, which differs from previous studies in 
which a specific set of clients only downloads data from a 
number of dedicated content servers. Finally, in P2P overlays 
each peer needs to simultaneously fetch chunks of content from 
a set of partners, while in conventional CDNs a client typically 
requests content from one specific server at a time. 
 
Figure 1: Dynamic interaction between TE and P2P overlay 
In this paper we model TE and P2P overlay as two rational 
players respectively who play the best-reply dynamics [4]: one 
player chooses the best response based on the other player’s 
decisions in the previous round. As shown in Figure 1, TE aims 
to optimize the overall network performance (e.g. load 
balancing) through adjusting routing decisions of customer 
traffic (including both P2P and non-P2P background flows) in 
the network layer. The outcome of path selection changes by 
TE for the P2P traffic is then taken as input by the P2P overlay 
to re-select partner peers in order to regain the original 
application-level performance (e.g. minimize end-to-end delay 
between individual peering partners). Such peer reselection 
further influences the overall traffic distribution in the network, 
requiring further TE-operations, and so on. Under such 
interactions, both TE and P2P overlay adjust their own 
decisions in turn according to each other’s previous behavioral 
changes. Based on this model, we investigate how well TE and 
P2P overlay may react to each other in such a non-cooperative 
environment. As far as TE is concerned, today’s solutions can 
be classified into IP-based TE and Multi-Protocol Label 
Switching (MPLS-based) TE. Compared with IP-based TE, the 
MPLS-based TE is more flexible in the sense that it allows 
arbitrary splitting of traffic across multiple active label 
switched paths (LSPs), even at short time-scales. In this paper 
we specifically focus on the interaction between MPLS-based 
TE and P2P overlays, as MPLS-based ones are ideal for online 
traffic adjustment that is agile to short time-scale traffic 
dynamics. Through our study, we aim to answer the following 
questions: 1) Regarding stability, is there a Nash equilibrium 
(NE) in this interaction between TE and P2P overlay behaviors? 
2) If the answer is yes, then does NE converge to an improved 
point? 3) What are the potential impacts on the performance of 
P2P overlay and network performance under such interactions? 
We believe that a good understanding of such interactions will 
offer significant insight into the future development of 
intelligent Internet P2P traffic management paradigms in 
dynamic environments. 
II. TRAFFIC ENGINEERING & PEER SELECTION 
In this section we first specify the modeling of the 
interactions between MPLS-based TE and selfish peer 
selection in P2P overlays. Thereafter, a best-reply dynamics 
model between the two players is presented for analyzing 
behavioral interactions between them. 
Let’s first consider a physical Point-of-Presence (PoP) 
network topology that is modeled as a unidirectional graph G = 
(N, A), where N is a set of PoP nodes and A is the set of inter-
PoP links. Each physical link a∈A has a bandwidth capacity 
Ca. The tuple <i, j> is defined as a PoP node pair where i, j 
∈N refer to a source and a destination PoP node respectively. 
According to our modeling, each peer is associated with one of 
the PoP nodes in the PoP-level network topology. The routing 
of both P2P traffic and conventional background traffic is 
determined by TE, without any differentiation. Let Pij represent 
a set of explicit LSPs between PoP nodes i and j, with each 
LSP consisting of one or multiple inter-PoP links. According to 
the common practice of ISP network design, bandwidth 
resources within a single PoP are usually highly over-
provisioned, so we only focus on bandwidth resources on inter-
PoP links in A. This means if multiple peering neighbors are 
clustered within the same PoP, then the associated bandwidth 
consumed by their local peering connections is ignored. 
According to common MPLS-based TE approaches, multiple 
LSPs are established between each PoP node pair in order to 
allow adaptive splitting of the overall traffic demand  across 
them for achieving dynamic load balancing. Let p2p np2p and ij ijt t  
denote respectively the overall P2P traffic demand and the 
overall non-P2P background traffic demand from PoP node i to 
j. Let tij be the overall traffic demand
p2p np2p
ij ij ij
t t t= + , and 
p
ijx (0≤
p
ijx ≤1) be the traffic splitting ratio on each specific LSP 
p ∈Pij. 
A. Traffic Engineering  
TE operations are normally applied by ISPs in order to 
optimize the overall network performance, such as load 
balancing and network cost reduction. In our modeling, we 
consider the objective of TE to be minimizing the maximum 
link utilization (MLU) which has been widely used as a TE 
performance metric in the literature. Once again, we emphasize 
that TE aims to optimize the overall network performance 
rather than any specific type of traffic, and according to our 
modeling, TE does not differentiate between P2P traffic and 
non-P2P background traffic.  
As previously mentioned, m (m>1) LSPs should be pre-
established between each PoP node pair. In our analysis, m 
disjoined LSPs with the shortest delay are computed between 
each PoP node pair. We introduce a binary mapping coefficient 
a
pY  to indicate the relationship between LSP p and physical link 
a: a
pY equals 1 if physical link a is on physical LSP p∈Pij, and 
0 otherwise. The overall traffic load Ta 
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=∑ ) on the physical link a 
∈A is the sum of all demands of flow over this link, including 
both P2P traffic and non-P2P traffic. With a demand matrix (tij, 
∀ i, j∈N), the objective of TE is to compute an optimized 
value 
p
ijx  (splitting ratio) across LSPs between each source-
destination PoP node pairs in order to minimize the overall 
MLU across the network, i.e.: 
minmax( )a
a A
a
T
C∀ ∈
    (1) 
MPLS TE can be operated at both long time-scales (e.g. 
weekly) and short time-scales (e.g. at the scale of minutes or 
even seconds). To allow for fast reactions to changing traffic 
conditions (e.g. due to frequent peer reselections in P2P 
overlay), we consider only low-complexity heuristic solutions 
without involving global optimizations each time (i.e. only 
local adjustments are applied). Similar to [6], we consider the 
generic TE strategy as follows. We identify a set of physical 
links with high link load and try to iteratively shift some traffic 
demand away from them in order to better balance the overall 
traffic distribution. More specifically, TE identifies the top k 
inter-PoP links with the highest utilization across the entire 
network, and then some traffic currently traversing those links 
needs to be shifted away from them. To achieve this, TE needs 
to re-configure the traffic splitting ratio for m LSPs between 
some node pairs <i, j> that involve those highly-loaded links. 
It should be mentioned that the shifting action should not 
introduce any new hot spots with higher link load than the 
original ones before the adjustment. Based on this requirement, 
such traffic shifting through re-optimizing splitting ratios at 
individual source PoPs can be recursively performed until no 
further improvement is achieved. Due to the page limit, we do 
not provide detailed specification of the TE algorithm. 
B. Selfish Peer Selection in the P2P Overlay 
The P2P overlay aims to optimize performance experienced 
by end users, e.g. to reduce end-to-end delay between 
individual peers. This is typically done by localized partner 
peer selection done in the application layer.  
In the modeling of the P2P overlay behavior, we recall that 
each peer is associated with one of the PoP nodes in the 
network topology. We also consider multiple simultaneous 
P2P sessions running over the network, with each session 
containing a distinct set of active peers sharing the same 
content. If one end-user participates in multiple sessions, it is 
treated as an independent peer in each of them. More 
specifically, let V denote a set of active peers physically 
attached to network G. Each client peer in P2P session t needs 
to connect to a set of partner peers from all available peers in 
session t (denoted by V(t)), and download contents from them 
at  certain transmission rates. In this case the actual partner set 
for a specific client peer u (denoted by Vu(t)) is effectively a 
subset of all the available peers in session t, i.e., Vu(t)⊆  V(t). 
On the other hand, let Da be the delay of physical link a∈A, 
and the delay between a PoP node pair be the sum of the 
delays associated with each link constituting the LSP that is 
carrying P2P traffic between each node pair. With intra-PoP 
delay being ignored, the formal objective in peer selection is 
to minimize the delay between each single client peer u and 
each of its selected partner peers i.e.: 
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where ,
a
u vY  is the mapping coefficient is equal to 1 if the 
carrying P2P traffic LSP connecting the PoP node pair where 
peers u and v are respectively attached to contains physical link 
a, and 0 otherwise. 
With such a selfish peer selection paradigm with latency-
localization, the P2P overlay may dynamically readjust the 
partnership connections for every client peer based on own 
measurements. As we mentioned previously, both non-P2P 
traffic and P2P traffic are shifted by TE without differentiation 
for improving the overall network performance. As for P2P 
traffic, there is the possibility that the end-to-end delay from 
some existing partner peers to the client peer becomes higher 
due to the traffic shifting from a shorter LSP to a longer one. In 
this situation, the P2P overlay may have the opportunity to re-
select some new partners with lower delay in order to replace 
those affected ones by the TE operation, i.e. the partners whose 
new end-to-end delay to the client peer becomes higher. Such a 
change at the P2P side inevitably changes the traffic condition 
input for TE, which may take further adjustment actions. 
III. A GAME-THEORY BASED ANALYSIS 
In this section we analyze in depth the interaction between 
MPLS-based TE and selfish peer selection behaviors in P2P 
overlays. We consider such interaction as best-reply dynamics 
where each of the two rational players decides its own best 
strategy in response to the change of behavior of the other 
player in the previous round. The MPLS-based TE and P2P 
overlay take turns to optimize their own objectives 
respectively in this interaction. 
In our analysis, the strategy space that is applied by 
MPLS-based TE can be described as a set of feasible traffic 
splitting ratios across m distinct LSPs 1{ ,..., }m
PP
ij ijx x  between 
each PoP node pair <i, j>. This can be expressed as: 
1.....{ .....,..., }m
PP
TE ij ijS x x=< >   (3) 
Traffic splitting in MPLS-TE is performed on per-flow 
basis instead of per-packet [7], in which case the P2P flow 
between each peering partners always follows one single path 
at any time. 
On the other hand, the strategy space of P2P overlay is a 
set of partner peers Vu(t) of every single client peer u that are 
selected from all available peers V(t) in each session t. By 
selecting the best partner peers, the end-to-end delay among 
peers can be maintained minimum for each client peer in the 
session. 
2 ..... ....( )P P uS V t=< >    (4) 
Based on the above specifications, we apply a Nash game 
model, which is a non-cooperative non-zero sum game, to 
model the interaction between MPLS-based TE and selfish 
peer selection paradigm in the P2P overlay. TE first optimizes 
the path selection decisions for both non-P2P traffic and P2P 
traffic without any differentiation. Since the actual delivery 
paths of P2P traffic are changed by the TE operation, the delay 
performance from partner peer to client peer may be affected. 
In particular, if some P2P traffic is shifted from one LSP to 
another longer path, the corresponding peers may experience 
higher end-to-end delay after such a change. In order to 
maintain the original quality of service as much as possible, 
the P2P overlay may reactively re-select some alternative 
partner peers within individual sessions based on measured 
delay in response to the changed path selection decisions by 
MPLS-based TE. Due to such reshuffling in peer connections 
in the P2P overlay following the previous TE operation, the 
overall traffic condition within the network changes again. It 
should be noted that, given the fact that P2P traffic dominates 
the overall Internet traffic today, behavioral changes in the 
P2P overlay may have a significant impact on the overall 
network traffic patterns. As such, MPLS-based TE may need 
to further readjust traffic splitting ratios in order to maintain 
its own objective. Generally, MPLS-based TE and the P2P 
overlay take turns to optimize their distinct operational 
objectives according to previous decision of the other player, 
which can be modeled as: 
1
1
( )( 1)
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Based on our modeling between TE and P2P overlay 
behaviors, we investigate whether best-reply dynamics 
converge to a NE in this interaction between non-cooperative 
behaviors. If there exists a converging NE, we may further 
analyze whether it is a globally optimal point such as a Pareto 
point [5], or a “biased” one in favor of either side. In addition 
to convergence, we also study potential impacts on the 
relevant performance of P2P overlay and TE respectively. 
Through this analysis, a clear picture can be drawn on whether 
P2P overlay can synergistically interact with TE in current 
network environments, and useful guidance can be further 
derived on how to mutually improve the performance of both 
P2P overlay and TE paradigms in order to potentially achieve 
a ‘win-win’ situation.    
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS  
In this section we first describe our simulation environment, 
including the network topology and the setup of the P2P 
overlay. The simulation scenarios and parameters are then 
presented. Following this, we present the performance metrics 
associated with TE and P2P overlay respectively. 
A. Simulation setup 
We use the real ABILENE network topology [8] at the 
Point-of-presence (PoP) level. The ABILENE network 
consists of 11 nodes and 28 unidirectional inter-PoP links. 
Each link has its actual link capacity and IGP link weight 
configuration. According to [9], the IGP link weight setting is 
based on end-to-end latency in the ABILENE network, and 
hence customer traffic is effectively routed on the lowest delay 
paths. In addition, the ABILENE traffic traces that are 
measured through NetFlow are used (with scaling) as 
background traffic in our simulation.  
The P2P traffic used in our experiments is synthetically 
generated according to the measured pattern of today’s 
popular real-time multimedia based P2P applications [10]. We 
consider 20 concurrent P2P channel sessions, with each 
channel attracting up to 1000 peers. Hence altogether we 
consider up to 20000 peers that are distributed across the 11 
PoP nodes in the ABILENE network. The overall distribution 
of these peers in each PoP node is determined according to the 
actual population of each city (PoP), in which case larger PoP 
nodes have more peers assigned. The channel session selected 
by each peer is randomly determined. Without loss of 
generality, there are both popular channels and unpopular 
channels on the P2P overlay side. In addition, we follow the 
observation that each client peer has around 40 peering 
connections in order to satisfy the overall downloading rate 
requirement for stable playback (1Mbps, [10]). For each 
requesting peer, there is one top peer partner which provides 
on average three times content distributions as other (auxiliary) 
ones based on the measurement of a popular real-time P2P 
content delivery system [10]. 
B. Simulation parameters and scenarios 
For simplicity we assume that TE can split aggregated 
traffic between each PoP node pair <i, j> onto two disjointed 
shortest delay LSPs (m=2). Such LSPs between each PoP pair 
follow the first/second shortest delay paths and are disjoined 
with each other. To make the analysis more comprehensive, we 
used three scenarios to analyze the interaction between MPLS 
TE and P2P overlay. We set the overall P2P traffic demand as 
low, medium and high proportion of the overall network traffic 
volume, e.g. the P2P traffic accounts for 40% (low), 60% 
(medium), and 80% (high) of overall network traffic. Such 
configurations are reasonable as it has been observed that the 
actual proportion of P2P traffic in the Internet varies 
significantly and it may peak at 80%. 
C. Performance Analysis 
 
Figure 2: Ratio of delay of 2
nd
 path to 1
st
 path 
As far as traffic splitting in MPLS TE is concerned, we first 
show in Figure 2 the end-to-end delay ratio of using the second 
LSP to the first LSP (the lowest delay path) between each pair 
of PoP nodes in the ABILENE network. This ratio effectively 
indicates the actual change of delay experienced by the peers 
whose flows are shifted by TE traffic splitting adjustments 
from one LSP to the other. From Figure 2 we can see that the 
maximum delay ratio is 13:1, minimum ratio is 1:1, and the 
average is around 2.6:1. Such difference between the two paths 
may easily result in selfish partner reselections by some 
affected peers whose flows are shifted from the shorter path to 
the longer one. 
 
Figure 3: Relative change of MLU for overall traffic 
Figure 3 indicates the pattern of the overall MLU 
performance change that is relative to the initial state (round 1) 
on per round basis (we consider 100 rounds in our 
experiments), i.e. 
)1001(,
)1(
)(
<< t
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tMLU  
We can clearly see that different proportions of P2P traffic 
have yielded distinct performance curves. Specifically, the low 
scenario converges to an equilibrium point which has 8% 
decrease compared with the MLU value of in the initial state 
(100%). Similarly, in the medium scenario we can also 
observe the convergence towards an equilibrium point, but 
interestingly, the final converged performance has a 5% 
increase compared with the initial state. Based on the above 
results, we can see that even if a specific equilibrium exists, it 
is not always the case that the overall TE performance will 
converge to an improved performance. The reason is that, after 
the adjustment of TE, the P2P overlay may selfishly reselect 
new partner peers which may lead to significantly worse 
network performance compared with the situation before the 
TE operation, and the next round of TE operation might not be 
able to achieve better performance than the previous round. 
By investigating the high scenario in Figure 3, we can clearly 
see some oscillation patterns on the MLU performance as the 
number of rounds increases, and more importantly there is no 
a specific equilibrium while having a worse MLU 
performance trend. As we mentioned above, P2P overlay 
selfishly re-selects the best partners if the original ones 
experience higher delay following the adjustment of TE. We 
can conclude that such selfish peer reselection behavior may 
have some significant (negative) impact on the TE 
performance in the non-cooperative environment, especially 
when P2P flows dominate network traffic. 
In addition to the overall MLU performance, we also show 
how the interactions between TE and P2P overlay will impact 
the performance of background non-P2P traffic. Figure 4 
indicates the change of non-P2P traffic utilizations that is 
relative to the initial state. We can see that in both low and 
medium scenarios, the background traffic condition is not 
significantly impacted by the interaction. However, if P2P 
flows substantially dominate the overall traffic (high scenario); 
the utilization of non-P2P background traffic may become less 
stable, with some oscillation observed from the figure. The 
reason is that, a large number of peer re-selections performed 
by the P2P overlay causes TE to unilaterally adjust the traffic 
splitting ratio between two LSPs. Since TE optimizes P2P and 
non-P2P background traffic without any differentiation, the 
non-P2P traffic may be impacted by TE optimization in 
response to P2P reselection behaviors. 
 
Figure 4: Relative change of MLU for non-P2P traffic 
 
Figure 5: Relative change of delay 
At the P2P overlay side, we first show in Figure 5 the 
change of end-to-end delay performance between individual 
peers upon the completion of peer reselections after each round. 
We only consider the peer partners whose connections have 
been actually affected by the TE operation. We recall that the 
average delay ratio of traversing the second LSP to the first 
LSP between each PoP node pair is 2.6. In the Figure we can 
see that for all the three scenarios the end-to-end delay is not 
significantly impacted (in a negative way) by the TE 
adjustment for most of the period, and sometimes such 
performance can be even improved compared with the initial 
state. This is due to their greedy reactions to the changed 
delivery paths – alternative partners can be often identified 
with roughly the same end-to-end delay as compared to the 
initial state. In Figure 5, the low and medium scenarios finally 
converge to equilibrium points that have 10% and 7% increase 
respectively compared with the initial state. The medium 
scenario has a regular oscillation pattern from about 5% 
increase to 20% decrease at last 40 rounds in comparison with 
the initial state. This observation indicates that the P2P overlay 
has generally high resilience capability in maintaining end-to-
end performance assurance against the change of underlying 
path selections by TE operations, thanks to the selfish peer 
selection behaviors. 
 
Figure 6: Relative change of partner peer churn ratio 
Finally we investigate the P2P connection stability 
performance that is impacted by the TE operations. Towards 
this end we define the metric of peer churn ratio to analyze the 
relevant performance at the P2P overlay side. As mentioned 
before, due to the experiences of higher delay following the 
adjustment of TE, a set of affected peers may need to re-select 
some of their partners to replace the original ones whose end-
to-end delay performance becomes higher. We define that a 
requesting peer that has any affected partners is an in-churn 
peer. This metric for the whole system stability can be defined 
as No. of Requesting Peers In-Churn
Total No. of Requesting Peers
. The reason to evaluate such 
a metric is that the transient time period during reselections 
may lead to perceivable service disruption for real-time P2P 
services, and this is in particular the case if a large number of 
partners need to be replaced for the requesting peer. According 
to Figure 6, we can see that the high scenario has the lowest 
peer churn ratio among all the three scenarios. The low 
scenario has lower churn ratio than first step and can converge 
to an equilibrium point (60% of the initial state). We also find 
that medium scenario has significant oscillations after 56
th
 
round, but it’s 40% of round 1 at most. 
D. General Observations 
We now discuss the issues we raised in Section I based on 
the experimental results. First of all, we can see that it is not 
always the case that a NE point can be reached. Even if such 
NE exists, it is not always a Pareto point. According to the 
MLU performance trends, we find that in the non-cooperative 
environment, TE does not seem to have high capability in 
driving the overall network performance to an improved 
situation when interacting with selfish P2P overlays. This is 
particularly the case when P2P flows dominate the overall 
network traffic. On the other hand, the P2P overlay has 
exhibited high resilience capability to avoid performance 
degradation in end-to-end delay following the adjustment by 
TE. Nevertheless, the high proportion of partner re-selection 
may lead to perceivable service disruption for real-time P2P 
services.   
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we use best-reply dynamics to model the non-
cooperative interactions between the P2P overlay and 
network-level TE behaviors, each of which has distinct 
optimization objectives – the P2P overlay aims to improve the 
experienced quality in terms of delay for every peer, while TE 
aims to optimize the overall network resource utilization. The 
decisions made by each have significant impact on the 
performance of the other when they optimize potentially 
conflicting objectives simultaneously. Through the analysis of 
such interactions based on our simulation experiments, we 
show that in the non-cooperative network environment TE 
does not seem to be efficient in optimizing network 
performance when interacting with a selfish P2P overlay. On 
the other hand, the P2P overlay is generally resilient against 
potentially adverse TE operations in terms of end-to-end delay 
performance. However, with the P2P-based real-time 
streaming applications being more and more popular, high 
proportion of peer partner re-selection reacting to TE 
operations may introduce service disruptions, and this 
phenomenon needs to be further investigated. We intend to 
investigate relevant interactions in more detail in our future 
work, 
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